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Abstract
In 2013 the Nuffield Council on Bioethics launched their report Novel Neurotechnologies: Intervening in the Brain. The
report, which adopts the European Commission’s notion of Responsible Research and Innovation, puts forward a set of
priorities to guide ethical research into, and the development of, new therapeutic neurotechnologies. In this paper, we
critically engage with these priorities. We argue that the Nuffield Council’s priorities, and the Responsible Research
and Innovation initiative as a whole, are laudable and should guide research and innovation in all areas of healthcare.
However, we argue that operationalising Responsible Research and Innovation requires an in-depth understanding of the
research and clinical contexts. Providing such an understanding is an important task for empirical ethics. Drawing on
examples from sociology, science and technology studies, and related disciplines, we propose four avenues of social
science research which can provide such an understanding. We suggest that these avenues can provide a manifesto for
empirical ethics.
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Introduction
In 2013 the Nuffield Council on Bioethics released its
report Novel Neurotechnologies: Intervening in the
Brain. The aim of the report is to identify and consider
the ethical, legal and social issues that arise from the
use of novel neurotechnologies, and in so doing, to
make recommendations that could be used to inform
research, policy, governance and public engagement in
the area. The report develops an ethical framework for
research and clinical practice involving novel neuro-
technologies, and it appeals to the European
Commission’s notion of Responsible Research and
Innovation (RRI) as a way of implementing the frame-
work. In this paper, we will critically engage with the
notion of RRI and the Nuffield Council’s rendition of
RRI in particular. We do this with the intention of
identifying how empirical ethics can contribute to
RRI; indeed, we believe that the contribution of empir-
ical ethics is essential to ensuring that the aims of RRI
are realised in practice. The RRI initiative, we argue,
has opened up a space for empirical ethics and can
provide the enterprise with an important purpose.
Drawing on a range of empirical ethics studies from
medical sociology, science and technology studies,
and related disciplines, we propose four avenues of
research and illustrate how each avenue of research
is essential to ensuring that RRI can actually be
achieved.
The RRI initiative
The notion of RRI has its genesis in a European
Commission Science in Society workshop held in
Brussels, May 2011. The aim of the workshop, which
involved experts from academia and policy, was to for-
mulate a broad understanding of RRI that could be
used to inform specific policy recommendations to be
implemented throughout the EU. The launch of the
initiative reflected a feeling among policy makers and
academics that extant policy would be insufficient for
managing ethically problematic areas of science and
innovation such as synthetic biology and genetically
modified organisms.1
The key premises of the initiative are that science is
the basis for a better future; that the benefits of science
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can be maximised (and the harmful impacts minimised)
only if it is carefully directed towards certain societal
needs in accordance with societal values, and that as
many stakeholders as possible should be involved in
anticipating and identifying societal needs and social
values. As one of their publications states2:
‘Responsible Research and Innovation means that soci-
etal actors work together during the whole research and
innovation process in order to better align both the
process and its outcomes, with the values, needs and
expectations of European society’.
The initiative, then, seeks to bridge a perceived gap
between the scientific community and citizens, and to
make science more ethical and useful by doing so. It
aligns with the European Commission’s goals to foster
an inclusive, knowledge-based society with a strong
economy, and in the process it draws upon prevalent
discourses that herald ‘public engagement’, ‘interdisci-
plinarity’ and ‘innovation’ as the foundations for
robust social and economic development.
Proponents argue that implementing the initiative
requires careful assessment of specific innovations and
foresight of their likely effects. Such foresight must
anticipate the social impact of the specific innovation –
how it will impact consumers and communities. This
knowledge, it is argued, will inform strategies that can
help innovations to become better embedded in society
and ensure ‘that their positive and negative impacts are
better governed and exploited at a much earlier stage’.3
The reluctant uptake of several recent innovations,
such as the airport security body scanners in many
parts of Europe, and the energy-usage ‘smart-meters’
in the Netherlands, are attributed to a lack of such
knowledge.
This emphasis on ‘social impact’ and ‘innovation
foresight’ has opened up a space for empirical ethics
within the initiative. It suggests that an empirically
derived understanding of the social world (or of ‘con-
sumers’ and ‘communities’) is an important component
of moral research and innovation practices. As Von
Schomberg states, empirical knowledge is necessary
for ensuring that technological development aligns
with accepted ethical principles (such as those found
in the EU charter on fundamental human rights) and
that the resulting technologies will not conflict with the
values of communities.3 Here, then, RRI entails
describing the cultural and institutional aspects of the
innovation processes, and describing and analysing the
moral opinions of those who are likely to be affected by
innovations. Social scientists who can produce empiric-
ally derived knowledge are thus rendered as necessary
elements of RRI, although like many elements of the
RRI initiative at this point in time, the specific mode of
social science involvement is yet to be clearly
delineated.
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ 2013 report
Novel Neurotechnologies: Intervening in the Brain, how-
ever, is an example of a more clearly articulated RRI
recommendation.4 Overall the report is in the same vein
as the European Commission’s initiative to encourage
useful and ethical science and innovation. It begins with
the premise that the current prevalence of neurological
and psychiatric illnesses that cause a great deal of suf-
fering constitutes a ‘great need’ for new, innovative
therapeutic interventions. Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, stroke and obsessive compulsive disorder are
given as examples of conditions where new interven-
tions are desperately needed, either because treatments
do not currently exist, or if they do, they fail to ade-
quately manage the illness in a significant proportion of
people. The report (henceforth NCoB) also points out
that the development of new treatments is likely to be
plagued by ethical and social challenges, due in large
part to the privileged nature of the brain: it is ‘uniquely
associated with “me”, with our subjective self-concep-
tion and capacity to develop and exercise this concep-
tion through our actions’.4 Additionally, despite a
recent flourishing of research in the neurosciences,
many aspects of brain functioning remain unknown.
For these reasons, the report states, ‘great uncertainty’
surrounds the developments of new therapies for
neurological and psychiatric illnesses.
The purpose of the NCoB report is to put forward a
framework of principles that can help clinicians, scien-
tists and policy makers to navigate this great uncer-
tainty while addressing the need for new
interventions. The report has adopted the notion of
RRI and has delineated six specific priorities of RRI
to make the initiative more concrete. These priorities, it
is stated, will be of ‘practical use both to those conduct-
ing and funding research and to those involved in gov-
erning the field by guiding the discharge of their
responsibilities’.4 In the following, we will critically
engage with several key RRI priorities of the report.
We are supportive of each priority, and we believe the
priorities can serve as a framework for RRI in all areas
of healthcare, not just neurotechnologies. But as we will
argue below, there are specific challenges with each one.
Drawing on previous work conducted within social sci-
ences, we will then propose four avenues of empirical
research which we believe are essential to ensuring that
the Nuffield Council’s priorities, and the RRI initiative
as a whole, are realised in practice.
Clearly identified need
The first priority of the NCoB RRI initiative is a thera-
peutic priority to alleviate suffering. Research and
innovation activities should be directed towards the alle-
viation of suffering of those living with illness, although
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the report points out that this does not mean that foun-
dational research, for which the clinical impact cannot
always be clearly defined, should be excluded.
Innovation, then, is a virtuous activity if it is directed
towards the alleviation of suffering, as this ensures that it
is fulfilling the needs of society. The report contrasts this
‘virtuous innovation’ with innovation that produces imi-
tative technologies, distinguished from already existing
technologies by superfluousmodifications, which largely
serve manufacturer’s commercial interests rather than
those of patients.
There can be little doubt that ‘clearly defined need’
serves as a good basis for RRI. The need to justify
innovation activities in terms of patient need, rather
than manufacturers’ commercial interests, is demon-
strated by the recent profusion of artificial hip
models, many of which provide little or no therapeutic
benefit over previous models. As Faulkner states, the
healthcare policy community has long felt that the
design, adoption and diffusion of new artificial hip
models has been out of control.5 Yet delineating
‘clearly defined need’ in terms of the alleviation of suf-
fering can be problematic. While in most cases human
suffering and the need for an intervention are obvious –
such as the suffering experienced by people with severe,
late-stage Parkinson’s – we should be wary of using
‘suffering’ as a justification in its own right. This can
be illustrated with ethically dubious research activities
carried out in the past. An example of such activity is
Moan and Heath’s attempts to produce a ‘treatment’
for homosexuality at Tulane University in the early
1970s.6 Moan and Heath inserted electrodes into the
‘pleasure centre’ region of the brain of their participant,
which was then stimulated while the participant per-
formed various heterosexual activities. Moan and
Heath’s justification for the research was that the
patient experienced suicidal ideation, paranoid ideation
‘highlighted by a marked fear of the future’ and that he
felt ‘sealed off and alienated from society in general’.6
The participant was certainly suffering, but few com-
mentators would agree that this justifies Moan and
Heath’s project. In such cases an individual’s suffering
is not the consequence of an illness, it arises from an
inability to align themselves with prevalent social
norms. The distinction here is important.
Generating robust evidence
This priority states that the innovation of neurotechnol-
ogies must involve the generation of robust evidence,
and that it should proceed on the basis of best available
evidence. Those individuals and agencies involved in
innovation, then, must both continually draw upon the
available evidence pool as well as actively contributing
to it. This will enable the continual appraisal of an
innovation’s efficacy and safety and ensure that it is dir-
ected towards clearly defined therapeutic need. In many
areas of clinical research, such evidence is often gener-
ated via large, randomised clinical controlled trials, but
as the report states, the development of neurotechnolo-
gies often proceeds as small-scale studies and investiga-
tive treatments, due to their invasive nature and high
cost. The report adds that this can be a hindrance to
the generation of robust evidence as dispersed, small-
scale studies may not produce the consolidated body
of data required to produce meaningful evidence.
Another complication with the ‘generation of robust
evidence’, however, is defining what counts as ‘evidence’
in the first place. There are various ways in which the
severity of an illness (and thus the effect of an interven-
tion on that illness) can be measured. This is demon-
strated by the range of outcome measures and clinical
assessment tools used by clinicians and researchers:
some quantify specific biomedical criteria or events
(such as frequency or duration of seizure), while
others, such as Quality of Life measures, attempt to
quantify a patient’s experience of illness. It is essential
that one of the tools used by clinicians during the innov-
ation process captures clinical improvements that
patients and their families find meaningful. If the
wrong tool is used, the resulting data will not adequately
capture the impact of the technology and its ability to
address therapeutic need. Indeed, clinical teams working
with innovative neurotechnology-based therapies have
noted that the standard, commonly used clinical assess-
ment tools in their area do not necessarily capture mean-
ingful clinical improvements.7 RRI, then, requires the
generation of robust evidence, which depends upon the
ability of clinicians and researchers to measure clinical
improvements that patients themselves find meaningful.
Continuous reflexive evaluation
The NCoB report points out that innovation processes
seldom follow a linear pathway. As basic science is
translated into new therapies, and as novel techniques
and therapies undergo incremental improvement, new
applications may become apparent. Or alternatively, an
innovation may become trapped at an unforeseen hin-
drance and its anticipated benefits become much less
likely to materialise. The report argues, then, that it is
vital that those individuals and agencies involved in
innovation processes step back from their narrow
focus on a particular application and cast a broad, crit-
ical eye over the current status of the technology, so
that they can continually appraise its ability to address
therapeutic need, and so that they can identify other
‘spin-off’ applications.
The report acknowledges that commercial interests
can hinder the capacity of individuals and agencies to
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provide such a critical appraisal. But as a body of work
in the ‘sociology of expectations’ literature has made
clear, hindrances to critical appraisal and evaluation
are deeply embedded in the institutional arrangements
that constitute innovation networks.8 Scientists, clin-
icians, research institutions, press officers and the
media become involved and perpetuate cycles of hype.
Such hype is not a by-product of innovation. Rather, it
is part of the innovation process itself: narratives of
‘breakthrough’ and ‘discovery’, which inevitably down-
play the limitations of research findings, are used by
those involved in innovation to secure attention,
resources and prestige, and thus form the alliances
that are necessary for an innovation to proceed.
Indeed, such alliance forming is increasingly inscribed
in the professional role of scientists and research clin-
icians. It may, therefore, be difficult for those agents
involved in innovation to ‘step-back’ and critically
assess the likely future for their innovation.
Coordinated interdisciplinary action
Another key priority of RRI, according to the NCoB
report, is coordinated interdisciplinary action. The
report argues that innovation processes should involve
a diversity of actors. The multiple perspectives provided
by such diversity enable a more coherent, comprehen-
sive appraisal of an innovation; it enables greater reflex-
ivity, and it ensures that the actual capacities and likely
effects (both positive and negative) can be more clearly
delineated and assessed in terms of therapeutic need.
Here, intra-disciplinary work is equated with fragmen-
tation and myopia.
The report, then, argues that interdisciplinarity is a
key component of RRI, but it provides no detail on
what disciplines should be involved or how we might
go about deciding what particular disciplines are
involved; nor does it identify what specific aspects of
research and innovation might best be managed by
interdisciplinary teams.
Overcoming the challenge we have highlighted here
requires an empirically derived understanding of the
innovation area. It requires a thorough understanding
of the numerous agents involved in research and innov-
ation, the nature of the interactions between these agents,
and it requires anticipating the cultural impact of an
innovation – the way in which an innovation will shape
understandings of health, illness, agency and person-
hood. It requires, in other words, empirical research
thatwill enable the priorities to become context sensitive.
Four avenues of empirical ethics research
In the following section, we outline four specific ave-
nues of empirical social science research. We argue that
together these avenues of research can generate the
knowledge required to ensure that the priorities identi-
fied by the NCoB, and the RRI initiative more gener-
ally, can be implemented. Each avenue of research will
be illustrated with specific examples from sociology,
science and technology studies, and related disciplines.
As we will see, each involves producing detailed
descriptions of specific social contexts. We anticipate
that these descriptions could then be used to inform
the formulation of normative measures aimed at ensur-
ing research and innovation activities align with the
priorities of RRI. However, unlike much of the work
that has been conducted under the banner of ‘empirical
ethics’, this does not necessarily involve the explicit
examination of pre-identified ethical issues; nor does
it necessarily involve examining how clinicians and
researchers themselves understand and enact ‘ethics’.
Nevertheless, we will argue in the subsequent section
that this work constitutes empirical ethics, albeit
according to a very broad conception of the enterprise.
Avenue one: Tracing innovation ecosystems
As science and technology studies theorists have illu-
strated, innovations emerge from the interactions invol-
ving numerous agents. The success of an innovation
depends upon its ability to appeal to, and be co-opted
by these agents, who can include clinicians and scien-
tists of various specialisms, engineers, manufacturers
and commercial companies, regulatory agencies, and
users and patient support groups.9 Together these
agents constitute what could be called an innovation
ecosystem. The notion of an ‘ecosystem’ draws atten-
tion to the embedded nature of an innovation: it both
shapes, and is shaped by, a network of relations invol-
ving assortment of interconnected heterogeneous elem-
ents. Within these systems, then, an innovation does
not follow a linear trajectory.
A thorough understanding of innovation ecosystems
is essential for continuous reflexive evaluation (an
NCoB priority) of an innovation. Ideally, by tracing
the formulation of such systems and the relations
between the elements that constitute them, it becomes
possible to predict particular patterns of innovation.
Patterns of innovation can be induced by powerful
agents within innovation ecosystems – agents such as
regulatory agencies or large companies which constitute
what Faulkner has called innovation ‘structuring
forces’.5 An example of an innovation pattern is the
degree of homogeneity between cardiac pacemakers
and neurostimulators used in deep brain stimulation
techniques.10 The homogeneity is a result of commer-
cial strategy: in the past manufacturers have been able
to save production costs by using many elements of the
same manufacturing platform to produce both
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technologies. An awareness of such patterns (which
may differ greatly between different sectors) will
enable the formulation of predictions about whether
or not a technology may be leading to an inevitable
‘dead-end’ and is thus no longer worth pursuing, or
whether policy changes are necessary to keep an innov-
ation alive. A current example of ‘innovation ecosystem
tracing’ is the ESRC (Economic and Social Research
Council) funded ‘REGenableMED’ programme in the
Science and Technology Studies Unit at the University
of York, exploring the development and implementa-
tion of regenerative medicine. The programme aims to
map the various agents involved in regenerative medi-
cine, with the intention of identifying the social and
organisation challenges to generating useful therapies.
Avenue two: Mapping the renegotiation of
boundaries
As a great deal of social science work has made clear,
the development and dissemination of innovations is a
transformative process.11,12 As innovations undergo
incremental modification and adjustment, so do many
of the agents working with them: new alliances between
agents form; professional boundaries between groups
may become permeable; and new social groups
emerge which, in the process of delineating themselves,
can lead to the establishment of new boundaries and
divisions. This transformational aspect of research and
innovation is particularly noticeable in the field of
regenerative medicine.13 New alliances have been estab-
lished involving cell biologists and clinicians, and new
interdisciplinary research networks have been estab-
lished at national and international levels. If we are to
facilitate RRI then it is necessary to understand the
processes by which such alliances form and the nature
of hindrances that can prevent such alliances.
Indeed, such knowledge is particularly important if
we are to encourage coordinated interdisciplinary
action, stipulated as a priority by the NCoB. It is neces-
sary to have a detailed knowledge of the boundaries
which prevent interdisciplinary work (these may be
financial, professional, structural), and the tools and
technologies which enable and facilitate such work.
This requires careful empirical research, particularly
ethnographic research in contexts where individuals
from different professional backgrounds are working
or attempting to work together. Examples of such
research can already be found in the social science lit-
erature. Coombs and Ersser conducted ethnographic
research of interdisciplinary intensive care units, includ-
ing observations of decision-making interactions and
in-depth interviews with members of an interdisciplin-
ary team.14 They identified a barrier to interdisciplinary
care and decision making: the traditional authority of
doctors over nurses. Doctors and their biomedical-
based understandings of patients tended to be fore-
grounded during decision making, while nurses, and
their detailed knowledge of patients’ families and the
patient ‘as a person’ tended to be ignored or devalued.
Similarly, Centallas and colleagues carried out ethno-
graphic research with an interdisciplinary team working
within a translational cancer research institution.15
Centallas and colleagues, however, drew attention to
enablers of coordinated interdisciplinary action. These
were ‘participation customs’ which were learned and
shared by members of the team and which permitted
interdisciplinary decision making while enabling each
team member to remain firmly entrenched within
their own discipline. The team as a whole was able to
establish and function as an effective unit without blur-
ring traditional disciplinary boundaries. Research such
as this can help inform the production of practical
guidelines that encourage and facilitate coordinated,
effective interdisciplinary action.
Avenue three: Exploring experiences of illness and
new biosocial forms
Understanding the experiences of those with illnesses
can help clearly identify the need for new healthcare
technologies. It is necessary to examine how individuals
make sense of their illness, how this illness is shaped by
cultural and social factors, and how it impacts on their
day-to-day activities and sense of well-being. Semi-
structured interviews would be an appropriate means
of exploring these issues with patients, such as Fox and
Ward’s recommended interview strategy for exploring
health identities.16 Here, in-depth interviews are used to
encourage participants to provide context to their
world and descriptions of their day-to-day life, and
they are then encouraged to reflect on the meaning of
these experiences. The knowledge produced by methods
such as this can help inform if there is indeed a genuine
need for a technological or pharmacological interven-
tion, or whether some other form of intervention may
be more suitable to help individual sufferers. This
knowledge could also inform the selection of appropri-
ate clinical assessment tools for quantifying the effect-
iveness of new interventions. It would enable
innovators to select clinical assessment tools (such as
impairment measures, disability measures and Quality
of Life measures) that capture clinical improvements
that patient’s themselves feel are meaningful.
Importantly, however, methods that provide us with
a glimpse of peoples’ experiences of illness also enable
us to explore biosociality. Biosociality refers the way in
which individuals and social groups draw upon bio-
medical knowledge to make sense of themselves or to
advance particular political and social aims.17
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Healthcare innovations can encourage new forms of
biosociality, often encouraging reductive, biomedically
based understandings of personhood and illness. This
has been illustrated by empirical work looking at the
impact of new neurotechnologies and the rise of neuro-
science.18 As Rapp has argued, one impact is that, ‘psy-
chodynamic explanations of human variation and
suffering’ are being eclipsed by ‘brain-orientated,
hyper-materialist explanations’.19 Identifying new bio-
social forms is a fundamental component of evaluating
the potential consequences of a new innovation.
Avenue four: Problematizing promissory visions
As mentioned earlier, individuals directly involved in
research and innovation processes are not necessarily
in a position to provide a careful evaluation of an
innovation: they may be too embedded in the institu-
tional arrangements that are responsible for generating
optimistic portrayals of innovations. Social scientists,
in contrast, are well suited to providing a more critical
perspective; a perspective that is absolutely necessary
for continuous reflexive evaluation. For example, a
burgeoning body of work within social science has
drawn attention to some of the specific institutional
pressures that generate over-optimistic portrayals of
the impact of innovations.20 Ro¨dder has noted that
increased competition for research funding has meant
that scientists and institutions are forced to market
themselves to the public and ‘key stakeholders’.21 This
has brought about the expansion and professionalisa-
tion of science press officers,22,23 whose role demands
that science and research findings are presented in a
manner that will attract the attention of journalists.
This has resulted in an increase in sensationalist news
reporting.24
Such work problematizes the promissory visions
associated with healthcare innovations, thus opening
up a space for a more genuine critical evaluation.
Another important role for social scientists is to
produce counter-visions of an innovation. Such coun-
ter-visions need not necessarily be overcritical of an
evaluation, but they can help provide a more realistic
interpretation of the future of an innovation and its
consequences. In order to do this, they need to draw
upon a detailed knowledge of the innovation ecosystem
and the way in which the innovation may be implicated
in the production of new biosocial forms.
Discussion: Empirical ethics and RRI
We believe that the RRI initiative, particularly the prio-
rities listed by the NCoB report, should provide an eth-
ical framework for managing research and innovation
in all areas of healthcare. Furthermore, we believe that
ensuring that the RRI initiative and the NCoB priori-
ties are context sensitive and thus applicable in real life
is an important task for empirical ethics. This task
would incorporate the four avenues of research that
we have identified earlier. Together these avenues of
research would produce a pool of knowledge which
would help ensure that innovation processes better
align with the values and needs of society, and which
would enable policy makers and commentators to
anticipate the likely impact of an innovation. We sug-
gest, therefore, that RRI, the NCoB priorities, and the
four avenues of research can serve as something of a
manifesto for empirical ethics.
We envisage that an empirical ethics guided by an
RRI manifesto would share the core goals of empirical
ethics in its current form, but that the scope would be
considerably broader than some descriptions of the
enterprise. The enterprise outlined here aligns with
Musschenga’s description of the ultimate aim of all
empirical ethics: to draw upon empirical data to
improve the context sensitivity of normative, prescrip-
tive claims.25 And in many respects, it would align with
existing empirical ethics work that, as Musschenga
defines it, has sought to describe and analyse specific
cultural and institutional contexts in order to evaluate
the practicality of guidelines and principles. Examples
of such work include Wainwright and colleagues pro-
ject which, by exploring the specific perspectives of stem
cell scientists, highlights the ‘socially embedded’ nature
of the ethical implications of stem cell research.26
Similarly, Brosnan and colleagues have explored what
‘ethics’ actually means to researchers working in trans-
lational neuroscience, and noted that their ethical view-
points produce, and in turn were produced by, scientific
practice.27 Such work has sought to describe the moral
frameworks of those actors working in clinical contexts,
explore how these frameworks are shaped by various
cultural and institutional factors, and how ethical work
and reasoning is actually conducted in clinical practice
and research. We envisage that an empirical ethics dir-
ected towards RRI would also seek to explore these
aspects. Such research might be necessary, for example,
to inform the formulation of specific RRI guidelines, to
examine the applicability of specific guidelines and to
explore whether such guidelines are influencing
research and clinical activities in such a way that
aligns with the values and expectations of society.
However, the avenues of research we have listed in
this paper broaden the analytical gaze of empirical
ethics beyond the examination of pre-identified ethical
issues and the explicit examination of how those work-
ing in healthcare contexts and innovation understand
‘ethics’ and engage in ‘ethical’ work. An empirical
ethics that follows an RRI manifesto would be similar
in form to what Dunn and colleagues refer to as an
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‘empirically driven, broad-conception empirical
ethics’.28 They describe this broad conception of empir-
ical ethics as:
. . .making empirical claims that describe or explain the
world as it is. . . The aim [is to] identify the actual eth-
ical issues . . . or to make sense of relevant experiences,
understandings, judgements or intuitions of individuals
who stand in relation to these issues. [This is then used
to] recommend some course of action, be it an act, a
stance, a guidance for acting or a policy to govern
action.
As we have suggested earlier, facilitating ethical
research and innovation entails research of social and
institutional factors that may not explicitly be identi-
fied as ‘ethical’ by either ethicists or those working
within research and innovation contexts. Tracing
innovation ecosystems (research avenue one) is a
good example. Such research is necessary for directing
innovation resources towards clearly identified thera-
peutic need, but it does not involve the description
and evaluation of a specific ethical issue. Indeed, the
very notion of ‘responsible research and innovation’
has, in effect, framed the entire research and innovation
process as being morally relevant. Ensuring that
research and innovation is responsibly directed towards
‘great need’ is an important task for empirical ethics,
but it necessitates an empirical ethics that is broad in
scope.
Funding
The paper derives from a project that was funded by
Wellcome Trust (Wellcome Trust Biomedical Strategic
Award 086034).
Declaration of conflicting interests
None declared.
References and notes
1. Owen R, Macnaghten P and Stilgoe J. Responsible
research and innovation: From science in society to science
for society, with society. SciPublic Policy 2012; 39:
751–760.
2. European Commission. Responsible Research and
Innovation: Europe’s Ability to Respond to Societal
Challenges. Brussels: European Commission, 2012.
3. von Schomberg R. A vision of responsible research and
innovation. In: Owen R, Bessant J and Heintz M (eds)
Responsible Innovation: Managing the Emergence of
Science and Innovation in Society. Chichester: Wiley,
2013, pp.51–57.
4. NCoB 2013. Novel Neurotechnologies: Intervening in the
Brain. Swindon: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013.
5. Faulkner A. Medical Technology into Healthcare and
Society: A Sociology of Devices, Innovation and
Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
6. Moan CE and Heath RG. Septal stimulation for the ini-
tiation of heterosexual behavior in a homosexual male.
J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry 1972; 3: 23–30.
7. Gimeno H, Tustin K, Selwa R, et al. Beyond the Burke–
Fahn–Marsden Dystonia Rating Scale: Deep brain
stimulation in childhood secondary dystonia. Eur J
Paediatr Neurol 2012; 16: 501–508.
8. Brown N, Rappert B and Webster A. Contested Futures:
A Sociology of Prospective Techno-Science. Farnham:
Ashgate, 2000.
9. Brown N and Webster A. New Medical Technologies and
Society: Reordering Life. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.
10. Gardner J. A history of deep brain stimulation:
Technological innovation and the role of clinical assess-
ment tools. Soc Stud Sci 2013; 43: 707–728.
11. Pasveer B. Knowledge of the shadows: the introduction
of X-ray images in medicine. Sociol Health Illness 1989;
11: 360–381.
12. Joyce K. From numbers to pictures: the development of
magnetic resonance imaging and the visual turn in medi-
cine. Sci Culture 2006; 15: 1–22.
13. Webster A. The Global Dynamic of Regenerative
Medicine: A Social Science Critique. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
14. Coombs M and Ersser J. Medical hegemony in decision-
making – a barrier to interdisciplinary working in inten-
sive care? J Adv Nurs 2004; 46: 245–252.
15. Centellas K, Smardon R and Fifield S. Calibrating trans-
lational cancer research: collaboration without consensus
in interdisciplinary laboratory meetings. Sci Technol
Human Values 2014; 39: 311–355.
16. Fox N and Ward K. What are health identities and how
may we study them? Sociol Health Illness 2008; 30:
1007–1021.
17. Rabinow P. Essays in the Anthropology of Reason.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
18. Pickersgill M and Van Keulen I. Sociological Reflections
on the Neurosciences. Bingley: Emerald Group
Publishing, 2012.
19. Rapp R. A child surrounds this brain: the future of
neurological difference according to scientists, parents
and diagnosed young adults. In: Pickersgill M and Van
Keulen I (eds) Sociological Reflections on the
Neurosciences. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing,
2012, pp.3–26.
20. Porter J, Williams C, Wainwright S, et al. On being a
(modern) scientist: potential risks of engaging the public
on ethically contentious Issues – case study of the UK
interspecies embryo debate. New Genet Soc 2012; 31:
408–423.
21. Ro¨dder S. Reassessing the concept of a medialization of
science: a story from the “book of life”. Public Underst
Sci 2009; 18: 452–463.
22. Peters HP, Brossard D, de Cheveigne S, et al. Science–
media interface. Sci Commun 2008; 30: 266–276.
23. Scha¨fer MS. Sources, characteristics and effects of mass
media communication on science: a review of the
Gardner and Williams 11
literature, current trends and areas for future research.
Sociol Compass 2011; 5: 399–412.
24. Samuel G and Kitzinger J. Reporting consciousness in
coma: media framing of neuro-scientific research, hope,
and the response of families with relatives in vegetative
and minimally conscious states. Journalism Media Cult
Stud J. Epub ahead of print 3 June 2013. Available at:
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/jomecjournal/
3-june2013/Kitzinger_Samuel_coma.pdf
25. Musschenga A. Empirical ethics, context-sensitivity, and
contextualism. J Med Philos 2005; 30: 467–490.
26. Wainwright S, Williams C, Michael M, et al. Ethical
boundary-work in the embryonic stem cell laboratory.
Sociol Health Illness 2006; 286: 732–748.
27. Brosnan C, Cribb A, Wainwright S, et al.
Neuroscientists’ everyday experiences of ethics: the inter-
play of regulatory, professional, personal and tangible
ethical spheres. Sociol Health Illness 2013; 35: 1133–1148.
28. Dunn M, Sheehan M, Hope T, et al. Towards methodo-
logical Innovation in empirical ethics research. Camb
Quart Healthcare Ethics 2012; 21: 466–480.
12 Clinical Ethics 10(1–2)
